The air over Washington is thick with martial bluster following the drone attack that killed three sleeping U.S. Army reservists at a base on the Jordanian-Syrian border last Sunday. Pentagon officials admit they have zero evidence that Iran was involved in the attack, but the warfare state is demanding Biden take retaliatory action nevertheless. Among the loudest voices in the chorus is that of retired Admiral James G. Stavridis, who from his perch at Bloomberg Opinion has called for hitting the Persians with cyberattacks, as well as unleashing the CIA to “create, fund and operationalize our own proxies against Iran.” (I thought we did that already with Al Qaeda spinoffs in Syria.) He also calls for “5-7 days of continuous strikes against proxy targets in Syria and Yemen” as well as attacking Iranian ships and oil installations. Stavridis is not alone in such bellicosity, nor could he hope to equal the likes of Senators Lindsay Graham or Tom Cotton for sheer inanity, but for a leading light of what former CIA analyst Ray McGovern usefully christened the MICIMATT, or Military-Industrial-Congressional-Intelligence-Media-Academia-Think-Tank Complex, Stavridis’ ascent to influence and reward (twenty directorships with defense-related corporations since retirement!) in our ruling establishment deserves close attention.
His military record exhibited all the signs of an accomplished courtier, ably negotiating the reefs and shoals of service politics as he shinned up the ranks. The key accelerant on his progress came in 2004, when he was picked by the odious Larry di Rita, Rumsfeld’s Svengali-spokesman , as the secretary’s Senior Military Assistant. In the process, he was “frocked,” vaulting from his former rank of one-star admiral straight to three stars – an almost unprecedented leap. Occupying this immensely powerful post, Stavridis oversaw the secretary’s schedule, travel and, crucially, controlled the flow of information reaching Rumsfeld’s desk. Reveling in the perks of his lofty position, Stavridis insisted on the provision of a special car for himself in motorcades, while junior officers, whom he importuned to do his shopping when traveling, staggered under the weight of his bags.
The Squeaky Chair Gets the Greaser
In a gratifyingly acerbic memoir, “Speech-Less,” former Rumsfeld speech writer Matthew Latimer recalled Stavridis’ assiduous toadying, offering fawning toasts to the secretary at dinners on overseas trips and busying himself with such humble but career-enhancing tasks as fixing a squeak in his master’s office chair. He was, reports Latimer, “surprisingly political for a military man” helping the speechwriters craft statements defending the secretary from political attacks – his favorite word being “fabulous” – and taking charge of a project to promote Rumsfeld’s accomplishments while also penning reams of groveling mash-notes to the man himself. Promoting an image as a “warrior-scholar,” he wrote fluently in the pablum that passes for wisdom in the debased culture of the Washington defense-intelligentsia. Thus in 2005 his treatise “Deconstructing War,” which opened with the fatuous proposition that “War is changing, and not for the better” and headed downhill from there, won wide acclaim among the Osrics of the think-tank/op-ed circuit.
In 2006, the hard work with chair-repair and mash-notes paid off when he was nominated by the boss to head Southcom, the military satrapy controlling Central and South America, not to mention Guantanamo, along with a fourth star. This was clearly the post for which he had been angling; officemates had noticed him listening to Spanish-language tapes for some months prior to the announcement. “This prompted some of us to wonder,” recalled Latimer, “how long does it take to learn fabuloso?”
Reward! Chateau and Private Jets
Obama brought change, but only for the better for “Stav” whose courtship of the
incoming team paid off in his apotheosis to SACEUR, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, complete with lodging befitting this imperial rank at Chateau Gendebien, set in 23 acres of parkland, close by NATO headquarters at Mons, Belgium. The job offered perks far beyond those he had enjoyed in humbler days at Rumsfeld’s feet, so much so that word of Stavridis’ habitual use of official jets and other appurtenances for the private use of himself and family eventually prompted an official investigation although, as is customary with such probes of senior officers, he was totally absolved of any blame or sanction.
Libyans Pay the Price
Meanwhile, and unfortunately for the people of Libya, he was given the opportunity to burnish the “warrior” part of his favored appellation. When Hillary Clinton fatefully bounced Obama into agreeing to attack Libya, Stavridis was on point, overseeing the deployment of Nato air power. Later, he boasted in Foreign Affairs that “Nato’s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention. The alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating situation that threatened hundreds of thousands of civilians rebelling against an oppressive regime. It succeeded in protecting those civilians.” In reality, the record clearly indicates that, despite some bombastic rhetoric, Qaddafi did not in fact make any attempt to massacre civilians, though he did use military force against the Nato-supported armed rebellion. Nevertheless the operation left a fatal legacy to democrats regarding the efficacy of interventionism, and this despite Libya’s subsequent and entirely predictable descent into bloody chaos and ascendant jihadism.
My Friends, the Jihadis
Retiring from the military in 2013, Stavridis eased into the Deanship of the Fletcher School, a perfect platform for ponderous ruminations on modish topics such as “smart power” which he defines as combining “hard power” with “soft power.” Among his ongoing and remunerative connections to the former was his chairmanship of the International Advisory Board of mega-defense contractor Northrop-Grumman, whose overseers could find little fault with Admiral Fabuloso’s enthusiastic tub-thumping for the new cold war. From Ukraine to Syria, “Stav” has been on the front lines, figuratively speaking, urging escalation against Russia. The Ukrainians should have “lethal aid” from the U.S., he announced in 2015, and when asked if that might not lead the Russians to escalate in turn, he conceded blithely, “when you release ordnance, everything changes.”
But it was the Syrian war that excited the warrior-scholar’s most martial instincts, an ominous indication of where the wind has been blowing in the national security set. So eager was he to show that he was firmly on board that he actually touted in public what others dared only murmur in private: in confronting Russia for mastery of Syria, it was OK to ally with Al Nusra, as Al Qaeda calls itself in Syria. “It is unlikely we are going to operate side by side with cadres from Nusra, but if our allies are working with them, that is acceptable,” he told Yaroslav Trofimov of the Wall Street Journal in 2015. “I don’t think that is a showstopper for the U.S. in terms of engaging with that coalition.” His recent call for the unleashing of CIA’s proxies indicates his love for the jihadi alliance has not diminished.
What a fab career!
I had an assignment to the Pentagon cancelled in 2002. Oh the places I could have gone if I'd been a suck up to power at the Pentagonal puzzle palace. Instead, I was assigned as a mostly chair-bound paper-pusher at the Presidio of Monterey in California. Not many opportunities to suck up to power there, though I did meet Leon Panetta at his institute there. (He seemed like a decent guy.)
In my experience, there's truth in the saying that some of the best officers are those who make O-6 (bird colonel on captain for the USN) but who don't make stars. Those who make stars, especially in political posts, seem to end up like Al Haig and Stav. They are hollow company men, mediocrities in the service of power and their own vanity, convinced of their own rectitude and therefore dangerous to boot.
Or so it seems to this retired O-5.
Of course Stavridis and others are amply rewarded for calling for Moar War.
What do you propose to do about it?